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The author looks at the state of the contemporary relationship between science and
theology and reminds all concerned that neither discipline ought to claim exclusivity as the
way of knowing all about the world. He shows how those who take their Christian faith
seriously and with integrity need to cultivate more flexibility in their understanding ofdoc-
trine and scripture, particularly those passages whose power has been shown to lie in the
symbolic and the mythical, rather than the literal and the physical.
Anyone who reads Dante's Divine Com-
edy, whether in the original, if so capable,
or in one of the many fine English transla-
tions, cannot but be enormously impressed
by the sheer synthetic power of his poetic
imagination in integrating into one compel-
ling narrative the cosmological, philosophi-
cal and theological insights of his times
(1265-1321). It begins memorably in that
"dark wood 1 ' of the frustrations, despair, and
dereliction of his middle years:
Midway this way of life we're bound
upon
I woke to find myself in a dark wood.
Where the right way was wholly lost
and gone. 1
In the confusions and loss of hope of
our present times we know only too well
what he means. But in the story, Dante is
led by the figure of Virgil, the embodiment
of Human Wisdom, to the very threshold of
Heaven through which he is guided by
Beatrice, the representative of all those agen-
cies which have become for humanity "the
God-bearing image, the revelation of the
presence of God." 2 She finally leads him to
that sublime ultimate vision of"The love that
moves the sun and the other stars." For most
of us moderns, including post-moderns, this
is a vision for which we may well yearn but
do not expect to be consummated. For that
human wisdom, which was personified by
Virgil and which today is dominated by the
natural sciences, no longer leads us so un-
ambiguously to the threshold of the divine.
The process of disruption of this uni-
tary vision was beginning to be discerned
later when John Donne, the English divine
and poet, wrote in 1611:
And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone.3
In this we hear an echo of the desolation that
was felt at the loss of an awareness of organic
unity. "Tis all in pieces"—of a divine place-
ment for humanity, and indeed of all things
living and non-living, in an organic whole.
After the seventeenth century, nothing
could stem the rising tide of an individual-
ism in which the self surveyed the world as
subject over against object. This way of view-
ing the world involved a process of abstrac-
tion in which the entities and processes of the
world were broken down into their constitu-
ent units. These were conceived as wholes
in themselves, whose lawlike relations it was
the task of science to discover. The stagger-
ing success of these procedures cannot be
overestimated. In the course of 300 years,
they have altered the whole perspective of
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Western humanity so that the historian
Herbert Butterfield, in his introduction to
some Cambridge lectures in 1948, could de-
clare that the scientific revolution "outshines
everything since the rise of Christianity and
reduces the Renaissance and the Reformation
to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal
displacements, within the system of medieval
Christendom." 4 It is the impact of this revo-
lution on religious belief in general, and in
particular on Christianity, which bore and still
bears the brunt of it, that is our concern here.
We have to take into account that the
media still propagate, almost unconsciously,
a "warfare" model of the relation of science
and religion, as evidenced every time the
British Association for the Advancement of
Science meets, when gleeful, and historically
inaccurate, 5 accounts of the encounter at its
1 860 meeting between T. H. Huxley and the
then Bishop of Oxford, Samuel Wilberforce,
unfailingly appear. To this day it is still not
regarded as professionally respectable for a
biologist to admit to being a Christian. In
Britain, not long ago, we witnessed a con-
temporary biologist, Richard Dawkins, in the
role of Huxley-redivivus, attempting scorn-
fully to denounce religion, as represented by
A vital aspect of the supposed challenge
of science to religion is indeed to sort out
how they differ with respect to the kind of
knowing they each represent—and this is
as much a challenge to science as it is to
religion.
the then Archbishop of York, Dr. John
Habgood. The occasion was the Edinburgh
International Festival of Science (April
1992), and it was interesting to observe the
anti-religious and biased reporting it re-
ceived from the science correspondents of
the more up-market newspapers. This pro-
voked articles and counter-articles, letters
and comments in the other media, showing
that "science versus religion" was still re-
garded as a newsworthy sport. The proper
concern should be, of course, with the ac-
tual state of their relationship. For it is as
true today as it was some 60 years ago, when
A. N. Whitehead, the mathematician-phi-
losopher, considered that the future course
of history would depend on the decision of
his generation as to the proper relations be-
tween science and religion—so powerful
were the religious symbols through which
men and women conferred meaning on their
lives, and so powerful the scientific models
through which they could manipulate their
environment. 6
In spite of several decades of sophisti-
cated and informed analyses of the true con-
temporary state of the complex and subtle
relationships between science and religion,
the idea that it is a state of conflict still en-
dures in the popular mind. Thus, most young
people in England and Scotland reported, in
some recent thorough studies, that, one way
and another, they had given up "religion"
because of "science."
As we read, for example, the reports of
the debate between Richard Dawkins and
Archbishop Habgood, we cannot avoid real-
izing that different per-
spectives are operating
in the arguments, con-
cerning the actual status
of scientific and reli-
gious affirmations and
what counts as evidence
for them. A vital aspect
of the supposed chal-
lenge of science to reli-
gion is indeed to sort out
how they differ with respect to the kind of
knowing they each represent—and this is as
much a challenge to science as it is to reli-
gion.
In a post-modem age, science itself has
come under attack as being sociologically
and ideologically conditioned, even with
respect to the knowledge it asserts to have
of the world. Religion, of course, has long
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had to suffer such attacks and the impugning
of its claimed knowledge of God and human-
ity. The presuppositions of what I say here
will be "critically realist" with respect to both
science and theology. That is to say, I think
that both science and theology aim to depict
reality, that they both do so in metaphorical
language with the use of models, and that
their metaphors and models are revisable
within the context of the continuous com-
munities that have generated them.
This philosophy of science has the vir-
tue of being the implicit, though often not
articulated, working philosophy of practising
scientists, who aim to depict reality but know
only too well their fallibility in doing so. A
formidable case for such a critical scientific
realism has, in my view, been mounted, 7
based on the histories, for example, of geol-
ogy, cell biology and chemistry, which dur-
ing the last two centuries have progressively
uncovered hidden structures in the entities of
/ think that both science and theology
aim to depict reality, that they both do
so in metaphorical language with the
use of models, and that their metaphors
and models are revisable within the
context of the continuous communities
that have generated them.
the natural world that account causally for
observed phenomena. Note that this view as-
serts only that it is the aim of science to de-
pict reality as best it may—it is, rather, upro-
gram for the natural sciences. Models and
metaphors are widely used in science: but this
practice does not detract from the aim of such
language to refer to realities, while it does
entail that these models and metaphors are
always, in principle, revisable.
Now theology, the intellectual formu-
lation of religious beliefs and explication of
religious experience, also employs models
which may be similarly described. 8 I urge 1'
that a critical realism is also the most appro-
priate and adequate philosophy concerning
religious language and theological proposi-
tions: theological concepts and models
should be regarded as partial inadequate and
revisable, but necessary and, indeed, the only
ways ofreferring to the reality that is named
as "God" and to God's relation with human-
ity. Models and metaphors play an even
more obvious role in religious language than
in science. In theology as in science, we have
also to attempt to infer to the best explana-
tion by application of the normal criteria of
reasonableness: fit with the data, internal
coherence, comprehensiveness, fruitfulness
and general cogency. 10
It is the aim of theology to tell as true a
story as possible. Like science, it too must
allow gradations in the degree of acceptance,
in the belief in the "truth." of theological
1 1 propositions, and must rec-
ognize that there is a hier-
archy of truths, some more
focal and central (and de-
fensible) than others. The
whole theological enter-
prize has often been criti-
cized because it has been
said to have no way, com-
parable in rigor to that of
science, for the sifting and
(testing of its "data"— in
this case, the content of re-
ligious experience and tra-
dition and the scriptures that preserve some
of them. However, some philosophers of re-
ligion have in fact been able to mount what
seems to me to be an effective defense of
the warranty of religious belief as expressed
theologically." For theology, like science,
also attempts to make inferences to the best
explanation—or, rather, it slwnh1be attempt-
ing to do so. In order to carry this out, the-
ology should use the criteria of reasonable-
ness already mentioned, for these are crite-
ria which at least have the potentiality of
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leading to agreement between people of dif-
ferent traditions (even within Christianity).
Some signs that this might not be an entirely
forlorn hope are provided by the changes that
were at least initiated in the Roman Catho-
lic Church by Vatican II, by the development
during this century of the World Council of
(non-Roman) Churches, and by the dia-
logues that are beginning to be organized
among the world's major religions.
The need now is for theology to develop
the application of its criteria of reasonable-
ness in a community in which no authority
would be automatic (for example, of the form
"the Church says" or the Bible says," for all
such arguments are circular). Truths that are
claimed to be revealed or are the promulga-
tions of ecclesiastical authority must not be
exempted from running the gauntlet of these
criteria of reasonableness, for they cannot be
at the same time both self-warranting and con-
vincing. This approach needs to be combined
with an openness to development as human
knowledge expands and experience is further
enriched. When 1 urge this kind of critically
realist aim and program on Christians, and
indeed on the adherents of all religions, I can-
not help feeling a little like theologian and
Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple
(1881-1944), who is reputed to have said, "I
pray daily for Christ's one holy, catholic and
apostolic Church—and that it may yet come
into existence." |: That could also be said of
the present situation of a critical-realist the-
ology. It has broadly the same intentions as
that described by Hans Kiing 13 as "truthful,"
"free," "critical," and "ecumenical"—a the-
ology that deals with and interprets the re-
alities of all that constitutes the world, espe-
cially human beings and our own inner
selves.
Now, in spite of what the "cultured
despisers" of Christianity might say, there
are "data" available to the theological en-
terprise, just as there are to the scientific.
They are constituted by the well-winnowed
traditions of the major world religions,
among them Christianity, which provides
our principal source in the West of tested
wisdom about how to refer to that which is
encountered in those experiences initially
dubbed as experiences of God. In this per-
spective, both science and theology are en-
gaging with realities that may be referred
to, and it is therefore entirely appropriate to
ask how what scientists believe about the
natural world and what religious people be-
lieve about God and human nature might,
or should be, related—as they always have
been in the history of both of them.
I began by referring to Dante's unified
vision of nature, humanity, and God. What
is the vista that twentieth-century science un-
veils for our contemplation? We know now
that we live in a world that, extrapolating
backwards in our clock-time, may be said to
have "begun" some ten or so billion years
ago in the fluctuation of a quantum field that
became an unimaginably condensed mass of
fundamental particles and quanta of energy,
and that has over millions of years coalesced,
in an expanding space, into the present ob-
servable universe, with its billions of galax-
ies, each containing between a hundred mil-
lion and a hundred thousand million stars.
Near one of these stars in one of these gal-
axies, one planet—our Earth—had a com-
position, temperature and age such as to al-
low the formation of increasingly complex
molecules from the atoms it had inherited
from some supernovae explosion eons be-
fore. By their inherent properties, some sys-
tems of molecules came into existence that
could copy their own patterns of organiza-
tion—matter became living. The forms of
living matter expanded by the incorporation
into their systems of other molecules, and in
doing so competed with each other for lim-
ited resources. Those life forms that pro-
duced the most copies of themselves at any
one time persisted longer than others, and
the evolution of living organisms by natural
selection was under way. The advantage of
acquiring new functions and abilities, in re-
sponse to changing conditions of climate and
the predations of other living organisms,
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stimulated an increase in complexity as time
proceeded. We note that the history of the
cosmos and of life on the Earth manifests an
emergent quality—for the concepts that are
hammered out by the sciences appropriate
to each level of complexity, and that are
needed to describe and account for specific
systems, cannot be reduced to those that are
pertinent to their constituents. Genuinely
new kinds of reality appear in the evolution-
ary process, in the course of time.
The advantages of accurate information-
processing systems to predict and adjust to
environments induced the development of sen-
sitive monitoring and information-storing sys-
tems—in fact, senses, nerves and brains. This
advantage could be further compounded by
social communication and organization; thus,
language, and, so, forms of consciousness,
emerged under pressures of natural selection
in those creatures capable of such information
retrieval. These propensities toward complex-
ity, information-processing, and consciousness
eventually coalesced in the uniquely concen-
trated form of the personal self-consciousness
Truths that are claimed to be revealed
or are the promulgations of ecclesiasti-
cal authority must not be exempted
from these criteria of reasonableness,
for they cannot be at the same time both
self-warranting and convincing.
ofHomo sapiens, who, be it noted, might have
exemplified the embodiment of these propen-
sities in a quite different physical form, such
is the interplay of chance and law, of sheer
happenstance, in the evolutionary process.
Thus, the original fluctuation in a quantum
field has taken the form of human persons with
all their creativity and diversity. The dust of
the cosmos has become a Mozart, a
Shakespeare, a Jesus of Nazareth—and you
and me! What might a latter-day, twentieth-
century Dante make of thatl
The humanity that has thus come into
existence through this seamless web of evo-
lutionary natural processes, as now unveiled
in broad outline by the sciences, seeks ur-
gently and even passionately for the mean-
ing of its own existence and of that from
which and within which it has emerged. This
long search for meaning is the religious quest
of humanity and cannot but be affected by
this new scientific perspective of where we
have come from and the processes that have
resulted in us being here at all. This is the
broad challenge of science to religion—and
indeed to all human reflection on our nature
and destiny.
So, I want to look at some of the chal-
lenges to certain central themes in religious
belief and consider what revisions of reli-
gious images and metaphors might be the
best way of responding to them.
God
The primary attribute of God in the
monotheistic religions is that of "transcen-
dence" over all-that-is. God having a mode
of being distinct from everything else. This
is based on the sound in-
stinct that the existence of
all-that-is is not self-ex-
planatory. Even the original
quantum fluctuation, from
which our observable uni-
verse is currently thought to
have expanded, had to have
a mode of being of a kind to
which quantum mechanics
could specifically apply, so
that it had to be a fluctuation in a "field" of a
kind describable by the laws of that science.
It was not just "nothing at all," even if it was
"no thing"! The affirmation of the existence
and transcendence of God is, then, a response
to the question. Why is there anything at all?
A response to the sheer givenness of it all
—
and the need for such a response—is en-
hanced by the scientifically perceived
subtlety and rationality of the observed uni-
verse. This response involves the recogni-
tion of God as Creator, as the giver of being
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1to all-that-is, as the ground of all being, as
Being itself, and the recognition of the world
as having a derived and dependent being.
This constitutes one of the fundamental pil-
lars of Christian theology, and indeed of all
the monotheistic religions.
The givenness of the parameters of the
universe has been brought sharply into fo-
cus recently in that cluster m
of physical considerations
referred to as the
"Anthropic Principle": the
fact that this universe is
characterized by a particu-
lar set of laws and funda-
mental constants that
prove to be just those that
could allow the develop-
ment of living matter, of
life, and so of ourselves.
The Anthropic Principle
re-emphasizes, firstly, what in the monothe-
istic religions of the world is perceived as
the contingency of all-that-is. Everything
could have been otherwise; it need not have
been at all in the form it now has. Hence,
the Anthropic Principle gives new grounds
for us to recognize the contingency of our
own existence and, so, of God's transcen-
dence—though I myself am less sure that it
actually constitutes an argument for God's
existence. Secondly, it restores for our gen-
eration a sense of how integrated is our hu-
man existence with the physical cosmos, that
cosmos whose sheer scale seems, on our first
apprehension of it, so daunting—threaten-
ing even. Not only is this Earth our natural
home, so is this universe!
In twentieth-century physics there has
been a development, initiated by Einstein, in
which the categories of space and time, which
seemed so given and a priori to Kant—and
to "common" sense—are themselves inter-
locked with each other in a new kind of rela-
tion. For space, time, matter and energy have
become mutually defined concepts that mod-
ern physicists link closely together. This
challenges naive understandings of the doc-
trine of creation. For any notion that God
gives being to all-that-is must now include
time as an aspect of, a real relation within,
what God has created, as St. Augustine of
Hippo well knew. Our understanding of the
doctrine of creation is restored to what the
profoundest thinkers in the monotheistic re-
ligions have always affirmed: that it is not a
There seems to be an in-built tendency in
matter toward complexity, self-organiza-
tion, information transfer—and ulti-
mately toward consciousness, cognition,
and self-consciousness. The original
"hot Big Bang," with its cloud of neutri-
nos, quarks or whatever, has become us.
statement about what happened "in" space-
time, because space-time, matter, and energy
are all aspects of the created order. God has
to be regarded as other than, and transcend-
ing, the space-time, matter, and energy of the
physicists. The doctrine of creation is fun-
damentally about the relation of God to all-
that-is, and this includes space-time-matter-
energy. It is not at all about what happened
at 4004 b.c.e., or even 10 billion b.c.e.!
But, together with the biblical authors,
Christians, Muslims and Jews believe that
God is not entirely "timeless," for they all
regard God as, in some sense, "personal"
—
as least misleadingly described by personal
metaphors, and as interacting with human
beings in a way best understood as like per-
sonal relationships. So God is pictured as
experiencing a sense of succession in rela-
tion to the world, including human beings.
We cannot put God, as it were, on a
mountaintop from which God views all
time
—
past, present and future—and, thus,
foresees all future events (including those
involving ourselves), for that would limit,
indeed destroy, our freedom. For us to be
free, God cannot know with certainty what
94 Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 1999
we will decide. There is no simple fact of
the matter ("At 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, I will
do X. . .") for God or for us to know. I would
suggest that we can best think, of God giv-
ing existence to all-that-is, i.e., creating
moment by moment, each interval of that
relation we call physical time (in our par-
ticular relativistic framework)—which is
what the traditional notion of God sustain-
ing and preserving matter-energy in space-
time must now be taken to signify. That is
how I and some others respond to the chal-
lenge of the modern physical understanding
of space-time-matter-energy in relation to the
idea of God as Creator. 14
The scientific perspective also chal-
lenges and, I think, enriches our notion of
another classical attribute of God in the
monotheistic religions, namely, the presence
of God in the world, the "immanence' of
God. We observe, through the sciences, the
operation of natural processes that are con-
tinuously and inherently creative, for mat-
ter has the ability to be self-organizing into
new forms. The process is open-ended, and
the details of the processes are often unpre-
dictable by us and will always be so, either
because of in-principle "Heisenberg uncer-
tainty" at the subatomic level, or because of
the in-practice inevitable unpredictability of
the future states of certain, far-from-uncom-
mon, nonlinear macroscopic systems. There
seems to be an in-built tendency in matter,
and the processes it undergoes, toward com-
plexity, self-organization, information trans-
fer—and ultimately toward consciousness,
cognition, and self-consciousness. Potenti-
alities appear to be being actualized. The
original "hot Big Bang," with its cloud of
neutrinos, quarks or whatever, has become
us. Nature not only has, but 1*5 a history of
events. There seems to be no inert stuff in
the universe, for all entities and structures
are in dynamic process in which the universe
manifests emergence of the genuinely new.
New realities go on appearing.
If we are to think of God as Creator of
such a universe, then we are bound to re-
emphasize that God is still creating in, with,
and under the processes of the natural world
all the time. God is all the time the Creator
—
it is an ongoing, continuous relation. God as
Creator not only, in this perspective, sustains
and preserves the world (the traditional un-
derstanding) but must now be regarded as
continuously creating in, with, and under
these creative processes. In unveiling the
natural processes whereby new forms come
into existence, science is revealing God at
work as Creator. God has now to be under-
stood as exploring and actualizing the poten-
tialities of creation, achieving ends flexibly
without laying down determinate lines in ad-
vance. God is improvising, rather as did J. S.
Bach before the King of Prussia, or perhaps
as does an extemporizing New Orleans jazz
player in Preservation Hall. Creation is the
action of God-the-Composer at work.
Moreover, in some sense, the world is
"in" God. yet God is "more than" the world.
God, in this respect, is more Creator-Mother
than Creator-Father, for God gives new forms
and life to what is in God, in "God herself,"
we find ourselves having to say. God is
present to all-that-is, the circumambient Re-
ality that flows in and around all.
Science, strangely enough, affords here
some new perspectives on the perennial
mysteries of death and pain and suffering.
For, through our scientific spectacles, we
now know that death of the individual is the
pre-condition of the evolving by natural se-
lection of new life and new forms of life.
Furthermore, consciousness, and, so. aware-
ness, cannot evolve without the development
of nervous systems and sensitive recording
organs, which inevitably have to be able to
react negatively to their environment with
what we call pain. It appears that pain and
suffering are the pre-conditions of sensitiv-
ity and consciousness, and that death of the
individual organism is the pre-condition for
new life to appear. What religious thinkers
used to call "natural evil" now appears in a
new light as a necessary part of a universe
capable of generating new forms of life and
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consciousness. This has the corollary that,
for our notion of God to be at all acceptable
morally, we have to regard Godself as suf-
fering in, with, and under the creative pro-
cesses of the world, a perception now widely
accepted by many Christian thinkers. God
is, then, to be conceived as suffering and
enduring what we call natural evil for achiev-
ing the ultimate good and fruition of what is
being created, namely, inter alia, free-will-
ing, self-conscious persons.
God and the World
But now another apparent challenge
from the sciences to religious thinking must
It appears that pain and suffering are
the pre-conditions of sensitivity and
consciousness, and that death of the
individual is the pre-condition for new
life to appear. What religious thinkers
used to call "natural evil" now appears
as a necessary part of a universe capable
ofgenerating newforms of life and
consciousness.
be faced. How can God be thought of as
interacting with, and possibly influencing,
events in a world in which all its processes
and events are increasingly rendered lawlike
and intelligible by the sciences, which in-
clude the brain sciences and psychology?
Many people in the past have been driven to
think of God as some kind of dens ex
machina, who, from some lofty, transcen-
dent throne, intervenes in the very fabric of
the causal network that same God is regarded
as having created. Oddly enough, science,
in explicating what personal agency might
be, now also helps to clarify how God might
be conceived to interact with the world and
influence events without breaking the very
regularities that Godself has created.
In the perspective of the sciences, hu-
man beings are seen as psychosomatic uni-
ties, evolving by natural processes, emerg-
ing into consciousness and self-conscious-
ness. Biblical scholars also emphasize that
this non-dualist view of the human being as
a psychosomatic unity is indeed that of the
Hebrew Scriptures and also underlies that
of the New Testament. This view can give
us an important clue to making more intel-
ligible the belief that God interacts with the
world to make some things happen rather
than others. When we act, total brain states,
which we experience subjectively as
thoughts, intentions, purposes, etc., are caus-
ally effective in the many-tiered levels of
our bodies. This action ofa
our brains-in-our-bodies is a
holistic one, in the top-down
direction and what happens
at the "lower" levels is en-
tirely consistent with the
known regularities of
muscle biochemistry, physi-
ology, neurology, etc. This
is but one of the more sig-
nificant proposed examples
of the way in which the state
of a whole macroscopic
complex system affects and
constrains the events occur-
ring at the micro-level of its constituents
parts. Many other systems are known to
manifest this kind of whole-part constraint
(or "top-down causation," as it has less fe-
licitously been called).
Such systems suggest a model for how
God might be conceived as interacting with
the world—for how God might be causally
effective in a whole-part relationship that
does not abrogate the known regularities of
events at their own distinctive level of de-
scription by the appropriate sciences. This
would not be an ""intervening" God, but
would be a God continuously interacting
with the totality of the world, shaping,
through God's own whole-part constraint
upon the whole, both the general course of
events and the patterns of particular ones. 15
God is faithful to the order of God's own
m
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creation and does not act in a way inconsis-
tent with its God-created regularities. More-
over we now see that God has let God's own
acts be circumscribed by the character of the
natural order Godself has created, even in-
cluding the inherent unpredictability of
events at the Heisenberg level, and of those
macroscopic events that result, in some cases,
from the amplification of quantum ones.
As often in the past, the model of per-
sonal agency continues
to be fruitful in helping
to conceive of God's in-
teraction with the world.
But now it is enriched
and nuanced by new in-
sights into the brain-
body relation, into
whole-part constraint in
complex systems, and
into the openness and
flexibility inherent in
the natural world.
Humanity
Like all living organisms, human beings
have a finite life, and we have come to rec-
ognize, through the scientific understanding
of evolution, the biological necessity of the
death of the individual. We as individuals
would not be here at all, as members of the
species Homo sapiens if our forerunners in
the evolutionary process had not died. Bio-
logical death was present on the Earth long
before human beings arrived on the scene
and is the prerequisite of our coming into
existence through the processes of biologi-
cal evolution, whereby God creates new spe-
cies, including ourselves. So when St. Paul
says that "sin pays a wage, and the wage is
death" (Rom. 6:23), that cannot possibly
mean for us now biological death and can
only mean "death' in some other sense, such
as the death of our relation to God conse-
quent upon sin. I can see no sense in re-
garding biological death as the consequence
of that very real alienation from God that is
sin, because God had already used biologi-
cal death as the means for creating new forms
of life, including ourselves, long before we
appeared on the Earth. This means those
classical Christian formulations of the the-
ology of the redemptive work of Christ that
assume a causal connection between biologi-
cal death and sin urgently need replacing.
Moreover, the scientific evidence is that
human nature has emerged only gradually
by a continuous process from other forms
of primates, and there are no sudden breaks
It is theologically imperative that the birth
stories and the doctrine of the virginal
conception ofJesus be separatedfrom the
doctrine of the incarnation and be re-
garded as mythical and legendary stories
intending to convey non-historical and
non-biological truths.
of any substantial kind in the sequences
noted by paleontologists and anthropolo-
gists. There is no past period for which there
is evidence that human beings possessed
moral perfection existing in a paradisiacal
situation from which there has been only
subsequent decline. All the evidence points
to a creature slowly emerging into aware-
ness, with an increasing capacity for con-
sciousness and sensitivity and the possibil-
ity of moral responsibility and, the religions
would affirm, of response to God. So there
is no sense in which we can talk of a "Fall"
from a past perfection. There was no golden
age, no perfect past, no original perfect, in-
dividual "Adam" from whom all human be-
ings have now declined. What is true is that
humanity manifests aspirations to a perfec-
tion not yet attained, a potentiality not yet
actualized, but no "original righteousness".
Sin as alienation from God, humanity and
nature is real and is about a falling short of
what God intends us to be and is concomi-
tant with our possession of self-conscious-
ness, freedom and intellectual curiosity. The
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classical conceptions of the "Fall" and of
"sin" that dominate Christian theologies of
redemption urgently need, it seems to me,
recasting if they are to make any sense to
our contemporaries.
Now, we all have an awareness of the
tragedy of our failure to fulfill our highest
aspirations; of our failure to come to terms
with finitude, death, and suffering; of our
failure to realize our potentialities and to
steer our path through life. Freedom allows
us to make the wrong choices, so that sin
and alienation from God and from our fel-
low human beings are real features of our
existence.
So, not only the question, Who are we?
but even more acutely, What should we be
becoming? and, Where should we be go-
ing? remain acute for us. To be brief, I find
the clue to the answers to these questions
in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. As
Irenaeus affirmed, "The Word of God, Our
Lord Jesus Christ, who of his boundless
love became what we are to make us what
even he himself is." ,6 So, then, this ques-
tion presents itself:
Who is Jesus?
Viewed against the backcloth of the
vista of cosmological and biological evolu-
tion that the sciences now give us, how is
this question to be answered?
Since 451 c.e., the Definition of
Chalcedon has been taken as the criterion of
orthodoxy. It affirmed that Jesus was "com-
plete in regard to his humanity," that is,
"completely human"—indeed "perfect" in
the sense of "complete" l7—fully human, but
(note) not necessarily displaying perfection
in all conceivable human characteristics.
Any assessment of Jesus must start here,
along with recognizing his special vocation
and relation to God.
But, one may well ask, isn't this start-
ing point in Jesus' undoubted humanity called
into question by the assertion in the tradi-
tions about Jesus, that there were acts of his
and events associated with him that have a
"supernatural" connotation? Consider, for
example, the supposed "miracles"? If by
"miracle" one means an event interpreted as
not fully explicable by naturalistic means,
then judgment must depend on one's a priori
attitudes toward the very possibility of such
events occurring in principle—and a scien-
tific age is, in my view, properly skeptical.
Briefly, I consider 18 that, in general, the heal-
ings and apparent exorcisms give rise to no
special difficulties, even for a scientific age,
but that the "nature miracles" certainly do
so. These latter usually have features that
denote them either as pure legend or as sto-
ries told with an overload of symbolic mean-
ings—in fact, "myths" that are true!
More pertinent to the theme are the ma-
jor "miracles" connected with the person of
Jesus himself.'
1
' Firstly, as regards the birth
narratives, found in the Gospels of Matthew
and Luke, the conclusion of Raymond
Brown, the cautious and very thorough Ro-
man Catholic scholar, is worth quoting:
[T]he scientifically controllable biblical
evidence leaves the question of the
historicity of the virginal conception
unresolved. 20
This verdict would be regarded as over-cau-
tious by other scholars less restrained by an
ecclesiastical magisterium. Thus John
Macquarrie affirms:
[Ojur historical information is
negligible... apart from... scraps of
doubtful information, the birth narra-
tives [of Matthew and Luke] are
manifestly legendary in character. 21
Biological science, in fact, also raises
acute questions about the "virginal concep-
tion." Since females possess only X chro-
mosomes, conception without a father to
provide a Y chromosome could lead only to
a female child with two X chromosomes,
unless there was some kind of divine tie novo
creation of a Y chromosome in the ovum
entering Mary's uterus—for the New Testa-
ment narratives never deny, and indeed af-
firm, a normal gestation period of nine
months. Even such a miraculous, almost
magical, act would be beset with problems:
What genes should the DNA of this Y chro-
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mosome possess? Those to give facial
characteristics of Joseph, or, if not, of
whom? So one can go on piling Ossa on
Pelion.
But a more general consideration now
weighs heavily with me because of its theo-
logical import. If Jesus is really to be fully
and completely human, all that we now
know scientifically about human nature
shows that he must share both our evolu-
tionary history and have
the same multi-levelled,
including genetic, basis
for his personhood
—
and that means he must
be not only flesh of our
flesh and bone of our
bone, but also DNA of
our DNA. If he does
not, to use the tradi-
tional terms, our salva-
tion is in jeopardy for "what he has not as-
sumed he has not healed." 22
Hence, it is theologically imperative that
the birth stories and the doctrine of the vir-
ginal conception of Jesus be separated from
the doctrine of the incarnation and be re-
garded in the same light as those about Adam
and Eve—that is, as mythical and legendary
stories intending to convey non-historical
and non-biological truths. In this instance,
the truth being asserted is that God took the
initiative in shaping and creating the person
and life of Jesus of Nazareth. 23
The situation is quite otherwise with that
other major postulated "miracle" concerning
the person of Jesus, that complex of events
we call his Resurrection (and in which I will
include also the Ascension or Exaltation). It
is not at all clear that the narratives, as such,
of the "resurrection," are sensitive to scien-
tific considerations at all, since the end state,
the "risen" Jesus is not open even to the kind
of repeatable observations that science and,
indeed, ordinary experience involve. The evi-
dence is that this was a genuine experience
within the consciousness of several witnesses.
Such a complex of experiences, especially
when they are communal, could well mani-
fest a new reality only discernible in that
particular complex combination. The con-
cept of "resurrection" appears not to be re-
ducible to any purely psychological ac-
count, and the affirmations of the New Tes-
tament can properly be claimed to be refer-
ring to a new kind of reality hitherto un-
known because not hitherto experienced.
Those members of the Church who take
no account of the scientific picture of the
world are forfeiting the future viability of
the Good News for humanity that is in
Jesus the Christ.
The sciences as such can make no comment.
I recall the penetrating statement of Chris-
topher Evans:
The core of resurrection faith is that
already within the temporal order of
existence a new beginning of life from
God, and a living of life under God,
are possible, and are anticipatory of
what human life has it in it to be as
divine creation: and that this has been
made apprehensible and available in
the life and death of Christ regarded
both as divine illumination of human
life and as effective power for
overcoming whatever obstructs it. 24
Jesus' resurrection demonstrated to the
disciples, notably to Paul, and now to us, that
it is the union of his kind of life with God
which is not broken by death and is capable
of being taken up into God. For he mani-
fested the kind of human life that can be-
come fully life with God, not only here and
now, but eternally beyond the threshold of
death. Hence, his imperative, "Follow me,"
now constitutes for us a call for the transfor-
mation of humanity into a new kind of hu-
man being and becoming. What happened
to him, Jesus saw, could happen to oil.
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In this perspective, Jesus the Christ, the
whole Christ event, has shown us what is
possible for humanity. The actualization of
this potentiality can properly be regarded as
the consummation of the puiposes of God
in the evolution of humanity. In Jesus, there
was a divine act of new creation, because
the initiative was from God within human
history, within the responsive human will of
Jesus inspired by that outreach of God into
humanity traditionally designated as "God
the Holy Spirit." Jesus the Christ is thereby
seen, in the context of the whole complex of
events in which he participated (the "Christ
event"), as the model of what God intends
for all human beings, now revealed as hav-
ing the potentiality of responding to. of be-
ing open to, of becoming united with, God.
But how can what happened in and to
him, there and then, happen in us, here and
now? Can what happened in and to him be
effectual, some 2000 years later, in a way
that might actually enable us to live in har-
mony with God, ourselves, and our fellow
human beings—that is, to experience the ful-
fillment for which human nature yearns?
The Work of Christ
I can here only sketchily outline how
such questions might be answered in the af-
firmative. 25 Any answer, to be credible to-
day, will have to be grounded on our sharing
a common humanity with this Jesus. There
are certain features in the scientific perspec-
tives we have been delineating that now prop-
erly constrain this response, namely:
(i) The biological death of the indi-
vidual, as the means of the evolutionary cre-
ation of new species by natural selection,
cannot now be attributed to human "sin"; and
(ii) The evidence is all against human
beings ever in the past having been in some
golden age of innocence and perfection from
which they have "fallen."
The Nicene Creed simply affirms baldly
that Christ "was crucified for us under
Pontius Pilate. He suffered and was buried."
This reticent "for us" encompasses a very
wide range of interpretations. Although the
Church in its many branches has never offi-
cially endorsed any one particular theory of
this claimed at-one-ment, yet a number have
become widely disseminated doctrinally, li-
turgically, and devotionally. They all (with
one exception—the Abelardian) propose a
change in God's relation and attitudes to
humanity because of Jesus' death on the
cross. These purportedly "objective" theo-
ries of the atonement also rely heavily on
those very two presuppositions I have just
mentioned as no longer tenable in the light
of well-founded science. Moreover, they fail
to incorporate our sense, derived from the
vista of evolution unfolded by the sciences,
of humanity as emerging into individual and
corporate consciousness and self-conscious-
ness, awareness of values, social coopera-
tion, human culture; and into a sense of and
awareness of God. The classical theories of
the atonement fail to express any dynamic
sense of the process of human becoming as
still going on. They also fail to make clear
how the human response, which is an essen-
tial part of the reconciliation between God
and humanity, is evoked.
So, let us now put the question again as:
How can what happened in and to Jesus the
Christ actually evoke in us the response that
is needed for our reconciliation to God and
actually enable us to live in harmony with
God and humanity here and now'? This ques-
tion may be answered most effectively, it
seems to me, by seeing the life, suffering and
death of Jesus the Christ as an act of love, an
act of love of God, an act of love by God.
In the suffering and death of Jesus the
Christ, we now also concomitantly perceive
and experience the suffering, self-offering love
of God in action, no more as abstract knowl-
edge, but actually "in the flesh." For the open-
ness and obedience of the human Jesus to God
enabled him, as the God-informed human per-
son, to be a manifest self-expression in his-
tory, in the confines of human personhood,
of God as creative, self-expressing Word/
Logosf'Son." Thereby is uniquely and de-
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finitively revealed the depth of the divine love
for humanity and the cost of God's gracious
outreach to us as we are, alienated from God,
from humanity and ourselves—that is, as
"sinners." As such, this love of God engages
us, where "to engage" means "to attract and
hold fast; to involve; to lay under obligation;
to urge, induce; to gain, win over." 25 The
Cross is a proposal of God's love and as such
engages our response. Once we have really
come to know that it was God's love in ac-
tion "for us" that was manifest in the self-
offering love and obedience of Jesus the
Christ, then we can never be the same again.
God in that outreach to humanity that we de-
note as "God the Holy Spirit" united the hu-
man Jesus with God's own self and can now
kindle and generate in us a love for God and
for the humanity for whom Jesus died, as we
contemplate God in Christ on the cross.
What I am proposing here is that this
action of God as Holy Spirit in us engages
our response, and this itself effects our at-one-
ment, is itself salvific, actually making us
whole, making us "holier." Such an under-
standing of the "work of Christ" coheres with
our present evolutionary perceptions that the
specifically human emerged and still
emerges only gradually and fitfully in hu-
man history, without a historic "Fall."
For since God took Jesus through death
into his own life, it is implicit in this initia-
tion and continuation of this process in us that
we, too, can thereby be taken up into the life
of God, can be "resurrected" in some way akin
to that of Jesus the Christ. Since Jesus was
apprehended as having been taken through
death with his personhood and identity intact
and as having been "taken up" into the pres-
ence of God, it could happen to us, and that is
the ground of our hope for our individual fu-
ture and that of humanity corporately. :f>
Furthermore the interpretation of the
death and resurrection of Jesus as manifest-
ing uniquely the quality of life which can be
taken up by God into the fullness of God's
own life implicitly involves an affirmation
about what the basic potentiality of all hu-
manity is. It shows us that, regardless of our
particular human skills and creativities—in-
deed, regardless of almost all that the social
mores of our times applauds— it is through a
radical openness to God, a thoroughgoing
self-offering love for others and obedience
to God that we grow into such communion
with the eternal God that God does not allow
biological death to rupture that essentially
timeless relation.26 Irenaeus says it all:
The Word of God. our Lord Jesus Christ,
Who of his boundless love
became what we are
to make us what even he himself is. 27
Conclusion
If the foregoing has any weight, then it
is an example of the way that the Church
must rethink its message in today's language,
for a society deeply impressed by and in-
debted to science. The old images, although
they may still be evocative and meaningful
for those steeped in traditional language, no
longer appear at all credible to those outside
the churches and other religious institutions,
which is 90% of those in the United King-
dom and most of Europe, it seems from all
the surveys. We need a rebirth of images in
continuity with what we have inherited from
the classical religious scriptures and tradi-
tions; we need to revise how we speak of
the eternal realities to which the religions
seek to refer.
For I am convinced that the importance
of ideas, both in the short and the long run,
cannot be overestimated. Those members
of the Church who take no account of the
scientific picture of the world are forfeiting
the future viability of the Good News for
humanity that is in Jesus the Christ. They
are digging themselves into a deeper and
deeper hole and, as they go down, they will
be able to talk more and more to themselves
and less and less to other thinking people.
For in God's good time, truth must prevail.
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duction.
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14. But this response is not undisputed,
for mathematical physicists take very
seriously—even reifying—their models of
a four-dimensional "block" universe in
which the future just is there already, so to
speak. See the discussion in Isham and
Polkinghorne.
15. This may be understood as analo-
gous to what is technically called an input
of "information." See the discussion in
Peacocke, pp. 1791T; chap. 11, sections
2(a), 3(b) and 3(c); and endnote 31, pp.
416-417, discussing J. C. Puddefoot's
analysis of the meaning of this term.
16. Irenaeus, V, praef.
17. Robinson, p. 68 and n. 3.
18. For a fuller exposition see Peacocke,
ch. 13, section 3(d).
19. Ibid., chap. 13, section 3(e).
20. Brown, p. 527, emphasis in the
original.
21. Macquarrie, pp. 392, 393.
22. Gregory of Nazianzus.
23. En passant, this does not, of course,
derogate at all from St. Mary's unique
position in Christian devotion and affec-
tion as the mother of our Lord, who must
have been the primary influence on his
maturation and one of the earliest wit-
nesses to his true vocation and role—and
in a very real sense, the Mother of the
Church.
24. Evans, p. 503. For a fuller treat-
ment, see Peacocke, pp. 319ff.
25. Oxford English Dictionary.
26. The virtue of being agnostic about
the relation between the "empty tomb" and
the risen Christ here becomes apparent.
For, within a relatively short time after our
own biological death, our bodies will lose
their identity as their atomic and molecular
constituents begin to disperse through the
Earth and its atmosphere, often becoming
part of other human beings. See the
discussion in Peacocke, pp. 279-288.
27. Irenaeus, loc. cit.
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